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Abstract        Using tools like argument diagrams and profiles of dialogue, this paper studies a 
number of examples of everyday conversational argumentation where determination 
of relevance and irrelevance can be assisted by means of adopting a new dialectical 
approach. According to the new dialectical theory, dialogue types are normative 
frameworks with specific goals and rules that can be applied to conversational argu-
mentation. In this paper is shown how such dialectical models of reasonable argumen-
tation can be applied to a determination of whether an argument in a specific case is 
relevant are not in these examples. The approach is based on a linguistic account of 
dialogue and text from congruity theory, and on the notion of a dialectical shift. Such 
a shift occurs where an argument starts out as fitting into one type of dialogue, but 
then it only continues to makes sense as a coherent argument if it is taken to be a part 
of a different type of dialogue.  
Key words    Conversational argumentation, dialectical approach, dialectical relevance, textual 
congruity, types of dialogue. 
The theory of dialogue types can be traced back to Aristotle’s Topics and 
Sophistical Refutations. In the second chapter of the latter work (165a38-b8), 
Aristotle classified four types of arguments, didactic, dialectical, examination 
arguments and contentious arguments. In the Topics, Walton notices (Walton 
1990, pp. 416-417), Aristotle wrote about four contexts of reasoning, or dialogue 
frameworks (1998, p. 11): demonstration, dialectic, contentious reasoning, and 
misreasoning. Demonstration can be interpreted both as a scientific inquiry, and 
in terms of a pedagogical dialogue. In particular, dialectical reasoning was de-
veloped in a set of question-answer moves in the VIII book of the Topics. The 
Aristotelian ideas were partly developed in the Middle Ages in the theory of Ob-
ligations, but later abandoned. For a long time, the old dialectic was thought to 
be merely an antiquated art that had no place in the science of logic. It was not 
until recently that a new dialectic insert 1was put forward (Walton, 1998) with a 
new classification of types of dialogue and viewed as contexts of argumentation, 
and meant to be normative models useful for the study of fallacies. Walton de-
parted at some points from the ancient heritage of the old dialectic, developing 
modern categories of formal dialectics and dialogue games. The new dialectic 
analyzed fallacies as arguments that can be used in a dialogue as sophistical tac-
tics, but can also be used as reasonable arguments in certain frameworks of dia-
logue (Walton 1998, p. 10, Walton 1992, p. 143).  
In the new dialectic, an argument is always an argument for a purpose:  it is 
a social and verbal means of trying to resolve, or at least to contend with, a con-
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flict or difference that has arisen or exists between two (or more) parties 
(Walton, 1990, p. 411). One of the frameworks of use of reasoning can be an ar-
gument, an activity that occurs in an interactional context, most of the times dia-
lectical. In this perspective, the Aristotelian notions of “reasoning” and “type of 
argument” are interpreted as activities in a dialogical framework. While for Aris-
totle a dialectical argument is a type of argument, in Walton’s new dialectic it 
refers to the whole framework of different dialogue types in which an argument 
can be used. In other words, the ancient method of evaluating arguments in a 
context of dialogue has been developed by interpreting the Aristotelian typolo-
gies of reasoning as different ways an argument can be used in a conversational 
exchange (p. 36).  
The purpose of this paper is to show how the new dialectical theory of dia-
logue types is connected to the explanation of fallacies and irrelevancies. The 
theory of dialogue types in the new dialectic is presented as a normative model 
that is useful to explain some fundamental aspects of argumentation. Dialogue 
types are analysed from the point of view of textual congruity and interlocutors’ 
goals. Using tools of the new dialectic like profiles of dialogue and common 
ground, it is shown how the model of dialogue types allows one to analyze the 
phenomena of dialectical shifts embeddings. It is then shown how these phenom-
ena are needed to explain dialectical relevance.  
1. Dialogues types 
The theory of dialogue types in the new dialectic was introduced in 
(Walton 1989, 1990), and further developed and organized in (Walton and 
Krabbe 1995) and (Walton 1998). In the new dialectic, a dialogue is conven-
tionalized, purposive joint activity between two speech partners (p. 29). This 
abstract definition of dialogue is applied to different types of “joint activi-
ties” by means of dialogue types. The interlocutors can, in fact, have differ-
ent kinds of goal, which influence the nature of the interaction. In this con-
ception of dialogue, we can notice that the two parties have individual goals 
(for instance, in a negotiation, getting the best out of the discussion), and an 
“interactive” goal (for instance, always in a negotiation, making a deal). The 
individual goals are sub-ordered to the collective goal, or purpose of the 
communicative interaction. A type of dialogue, in this perspective, is a nor-
mative framework in which there is an exchange of arguments between two 
speech partners reasoning together in turn-taking sequence aimed at a collec-
tive goal (Walton 1998, p. 30).  
Dialogue types can be characterized by the type of commitments (pro-
positional or not), the type of starting point (contrast of opinion, open prob-
lem, decision to be made), the type of dialogical goal (persuading, making a 
deal…). The typology of dialogue types is represented in table 1. 
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TYPE INITIAL 
SITUATION
MAIN GOAL PARTICIPANTS’
AIMS
SIDE BENEFITS
1. Persua-
sion Dia-
logue
Conflicting
points of 
view
Resolution of 
such conflicts by 
verbal means 
Persuade the 
other(s) 
Develop and re-
veal positions 
Build up confi-
dence
Influence
onlookers,
Add to prestige 
2. Nego-
tiation
Conflict of 
interests & 
need for 
cooperation
Making a deal Get the best out 
of it for oneself
Agreement, 
Build up confi-
dence
Reveal position  
Influence
onlookers
Add to prestige 
3. Inquiry  General 
ignorance
Growth of 
knowledge & 
agreement 
Find a “proof” or 
destroy one 
Add to prestige  
Gain experience  
Raise funds
4. Delib-
eration
Need for 
action
Reach a decision Influence out-
come  
Agreement  
Develop & re-
veal positions  
Add to prestige, 
Vent emotions  
5. Infor-
mation-
seeking 
Personal
Ignorance
Spreading
knowledge and 
revealing posi-
tions
Gain, pass on, 
show, or hide 
personal knowl-
edge
Agreement  
Develop & re-
veal positions  
Add to prestige, 
Vent emotions 
6. Eristics Conflict & 
antagonism 
Reaching a 
(provisional)
accommodation 
in a relationship  
Strike the other 
party & win in 
the eyes of 
onlookers
Agreement  
Develop & re-
veal positions  
Gain experience, 
Amusement  
Add to prestige, 
Vent emotions 
Table 1: Types of Dialogue and their Characteristics (Walton and Krabbe 
1995, p. 66). 
In a persuasion dialogue, one party, the proponent, tries to persuade by 
means of arguments the other party, the respondent, that a thesis is true (Walton 
1998, p. 37). In a persuasion dialogue, the disagreement between the interlocu-
tors stems from the respondent being convinced of the truth of a proposition op-
posite to the proponent’s thesis. The role of the respondent, in this dialogue, is to 
prove his own thesis. Each party tries to persuade the other party to change his 
opinion, by leading it by means of arguments to commit himself to or to concede 
certain propositions. Persuasion dialogue can be identified with the critical dis-
cussion analyzed by (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1984; 1987; 1992).  
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Negotiation is an interest-based context of dialogue, in which the goal is to 
make a deal. Both parties try to maximize the benefits they can get out of it, and 
try to reach a compromise which is acceptable by both of them. In this type of 
dialogue, persuasion may be irrelevant or secondary, and it is involved usually to 
set up a dialogue agenda for negotiation. In negotiation, the goal is not to show 
that a proposition is acceptable or right; for this reason, a commitment is not an 
assertion that some proposition is true (Walton 1993, p. 94). Commitments are 
instead concessions of some goods or services in order to lead the interlocutor to 
comparable concessions, until a settlement is reached.  
Inquiry is a collaborative investigation aimed at proving a proposition, or 
showing the impossibility of proving it. The focus is on propositions, not on in-
terests such as negotiation, but the starting point is not a conflict of opinion, such 
as the persuasion dialogue, but an open problem. The inquiry can be successful 
only when all participants agree upon the same conclusion at the end. In this type 
of dialogue, similar to the Aristotelian demonstration, the premises of an instance 
of reasoning are supposed to be better established than its conclusion. The goal is 
not to show the plausibility or acceptability of a proposition, such as in the per-
suasion dialogue, but to prove that a proposition is or is not part of the estab-
lished knowledge. Moreover, retraction of commitments is not generally permit-
ted.  
Deliberation in the new dialectic is similar to inquiry inasmuch as it starts 
from an open problem. However, the problem is practical and the goal of a delib-
eration is to decide how to act. The main goal is agreement, but it does not coin-
cide with the end of the dialogue, since a decision can be made by an authority 
without the general agreement. Deliberation is concerned with the future and 
plans. The interlocutors have to balance the pro and cons of a possible course of 
action, assessing its possible consequences. The typical kind of reasoning in-
volved is called practical reasoning: an agent considers different possibilities of 
carrying out an action on the basis of its consequences, and chooses the one lead-
ing to the best, or less negative, outcome relative to the goal in a set of circum-
stances.   
In an information-seeking dialogue, a participant lacks and needs some in-
formation and requests it from the interlocutor, who is an expert, or has some 
knowledge, or is position to know something. Unlike the other kinds of dialogue, 
the information-seeking type is grounded on an asymmetrical dialogical relation-
ship, in which the goal is to spread knowledge. Information-seeking has not as its 
purpose to prove something, but to retrieve a piece of knowledge. For instance, 
an example of this type of dialogue can be provided by the case below (Walton 
1996, p. 61). A tourist needs a piece of information, and asks a person supposed 
to know it.  
Case 1 
First tourist: Could you tell me where the Central Station is? 
Shopkeeper: It is across the bridge, one kilometer south 
First tourist: Thank you [to the second tourist]. Ok. Let’s head for the 
bridge.  
Eristic dialogue can be considered a family of dialogues characterized by 
verbal fighting aimed at reaching a provisional accommodation in a relationship. 
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Both participants try to win, that is, achieve some effects on onlookers, for in-
stance, striking him out or humiliating him. However, the goal of the dialogue is 
to resolve a situation of antagonism and conflict between two parties, releasing 
powerful emotions that otherwise would degenerate into physical fights or frus-
tration. Eristic dialogues vent repressed emotions, and are characterized by anar-
chy in rules.  
The dialogue types have subtypes, characterized by different factors. For in-
stance, persuasion dialogue can be classified into its subtypes according to the 
type of initial conflict (single, multiple, compound), the nature of the matter dis-
cussed, the degree of rigidity of the rules, the preciseness of the procedural de-
scription of the dialogue, the admixtures from other types of dialogue. A typical 
case of admixture is the discussion of a proposal, a persuasion dialogue embed-
ded into a larger deliberation dialogue. In other cases, the admixture does not af-
fect the goal or the essential characteristics of the dialogue, influencing only the 
relationship between the interlocutors (Walton and Krabbe call it “flavour”). For 
instance, in a persuasion dialogue, one party may behave as an expert, introduc-
ing a certain asymmetry between the participants. Other relevant criteria are the 
knowledge of the participants and their role. For instance, the expert consulta-
tion, a subtype of information-seeking dialogue, is characterized by fact that one 
party is an expert while the other is not. In the didactic subtype of information 
seeking, in addition to the different role of the interlocutors, the purpose is dif-
ferent. In this context, the purpose is to turn the layman into an expert himself. 
The position of the person is determinant in characterizing the interview, in 
which the subject is an important person or somebody having a story to tell. The 
subtypes of dialogue can be represented as shown in table 2. 
TYPE SUBTYPES TYPE SUBTYPES
Dispute  Means-ends discussion 
Formal discussion Discussion of ends 
1. Persuasion 
Dialogue
Discussion of proposals 
4. Deliberation 
Board meeting 
Bargaining  Expert consultation 2. Negotiation
Making a package deal Didactic dialogue 
Scientific research  Interview 
Investigation
5. Information-
Seeking 
Interrogation
Eristic discussion 
3. Inquiry  
Examination 6. Eristics 
Quarrel
Table 2: Subtypes of Dialogue in the New Dialectic 
The notion of admixture introduces one of the most critical and basic aspects of 
the dialogue types theory, the relations between dialogue contexts. Dialogue 
models are normative frameworks and are used to describe and evaluate every-
day dialogical interactions. Real dialogues are much more complex and articu-
lated than the six typologies presented. Often they present characteristics belong-
ing to different dialogue types. In (Walton 1990) debate is for instance analysed 
as a persuasion dialogue having some features of an eristic confrontation. The 
participants’ goal is to persuade a third party, but in this process of persuasion 
the rules are quite permissive and allow direct attack and moves similar to a 
quarrel. However, debate has rules, unlike a quarrel. These rules can be more or 
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less strict, depending on the institutional context in which the debate takes place. 
For instance, in a university debate certain kinds of personal attack allowed in a 
political debate are not permitted. Debate is one of the three mixed dialogues 
analysed in (Walton and Krabbe 1995, pp. 83-85). The other two types of dia-
logue are the committee meeting and the Socratic dialogue. In a committee meet-
ing all the types of dialogue can be mixed. The goal of a committee meeting is to 
make recommendations that are binding. The general goal can be, for instance, to 
form a collaborative plan to carry out an action, and as a first stage the kind of 
dialogue is deliberation. The other members of the committee board can oppose 
a proposal. In order to reach agreement, persuasion, eristic, inquiry and informa-
tion-seeking can be involved. Socratic dialogue is a kind of inquiry, but persua-
sion is an essential part of it. Socratic dialogue starts from an open problem, but 
proceeds with a series of persuasion sub-dialogues, in which Socrates questions 
or refutes the thesis his interlocutor is committed to. In this kind of persuasion 
dialogue, persuasion is mixed with inquiry and a maieutic function is performed. 
The three most important mixed dialogues are summarized in table 3 (p. 66):  
MIXED DIALOGUES INITIAL SITUATION MAIN GOAL PARTICIPANTS’
AIMS
Debate
(Persuasion and 
eristics)  
Conflicting points 
of view in front of 
a third party  
Accommodating con-
flicting points of 
view
Persuade or influ-
ence each other and 
a third party 
Committee meeting 
(Mainly delibera-
tion)
Conflict & an-
tagonism & need 
for agreement in 
practical matters 
Working out a policy 
and endorsing it 
Influence outcome  
Socratic Dialogue 
(Mainly persuasion 
dialogue) 
Illusion of knowl-
edge
Maieutic function 
(bringing to birth 
new ideas through 
the discussion) 
Refute and avoid 
being refuted 
agreement 
Table 3: Mixed Dialogues in the New Dialectic 
2. Embeddings and Dialogue Shifts  
Dialogue models, as shown in table 1, are not independent and unrelated frame-
works, but tools to evaluate and analyze real dialogues. Real dialogues often in-
volve more than a dialogue type, or shift from one dialogue type to another. Per-
suasion, for instance, can be involved in negotiation or inquiry, inquiry, in its 
turn, can easily shift to information seeking. For instance, before a negotiation 
can start, the participants have to agree upon an agenda, and this process is regu-
lated by a persuasive context of dialogue. In an inquiry, when a person reaches a 
conclusion, his goal becomes to convince the other interlocutors; on the other 
hand, in order to prove a point information often needs to be collected.  
Dialectical shifts, as modelled in the new dialectic, are distinguished from 
mixed dialogues and dialogue flavours. In a shift, there is a transition from a type 
of dialogue to another, not a mixture of dialogues involving essential or non es-
sential dialogical characteristics. Dialectical shifts can be sudden or gradual 
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(Walton 1992, p. 138), that is, there can be a déplacement of one type by another, 
or a shifting from one dialogue to another. In the first case, the dialogue the par-
ticipants are involved in is (temporally) closed and a new verbal interaction is 
opened, unrelated to the previous one. For instance, after a negotiation, the inter-
locutors can meet in a bar and start arguing about soccer (Walton and Krabbe 
1995, p. 101). In the second case, the dialogue in which the conversation has 
shifted is related to the previous. For instance, in a discussion about the decision 
on whether or not to build a new nuclear reactor, experts may be consulted on 
whether nuclear reactors are safe (Walton 1992, p. 138).  
Dialectical shifts can be licit or illicit. In the licit shifts, the second dialogue 
is functionally related to the first dialogue. In this case, the second dialogue is 
embedded in the first one, because it helps the first dialogue to move along con-
structively. For instance, negotiation dialogues often shift to persuasion dialogue, 
such as in case of divorce dispute mediation. In these types of negotiation, the 
shift to a persuasion dialogue on themes like child custody allows the partici-
pants to evaluate the situation and to make the most reasonable deal. On the con-
trary, the dialogue might shift to a quarrel, in which the two parties counter-
blame each other. In this case, however, the shift is not constructive for the pur-
pose of the interaction, but prevents the deal from being made. Embeddings can 
occur in case the main dialogue comes to a deadlock, or to a point in which per-
suading the initial interactive goal would not lead to any result. We can consider, 
for instance, the following case (Walton 1998, pp. 116-117):  
Case 2 
Suppose you have entered into a fixed-price construction contract for you 
house that calls for reinforced concrete foundations but fails to specify how 
deep they should be. The contractor suggests two feet. You think five feet is 
closer to the usual depth for your type of house. Now suppose the contractor 
says: ‘I went along with you on steel girders for the roof. It’s your turn to go 
along with me on shallower foundations’. No owner in his right mind would 
yield. Rather than horse-trade, you would insist on deciding the issue in 
terms of objective safety standards. ‘Look, maybe I’m wrong. Maybe two 
feet is enough. What I want are foundations strong and deep enough to hold 
up the building safely. Does the government have standard specifications for 
these soil conditions? How deep are the foundations of other buildings in 
this area? What is the earthquake risk here? Where do you suggest we look 
for standards to resolve this question?   
In this case, a negotiation temporarily shifts to an information-seeking dia-
logue. The information required is necessary to allow the negotiation to move 
further. In this verbal exchange, the negotiation shifts to an information-seeking 
in order to go over a deadlock, or a situation in which the two parties would not 
have been able to resolve the conflict of interests. When the information needed 
to the negotiation is retrieved, the dialogue can shift back to negotiation.  
As seen above, dialogues are characterized by the main goal of the dialogue 
and by the individual purposes of the interlocutors. Both the participants must 
agree upon the goal of the interaction, in order for it to be successful. In case of 
licit shift, the main goal of the dialogue is maintained (embedding), or a new 
goal is agreed upon by the two parties (sudden shift). However, sometimes the 
108 DOUGLAS N. WALTON – FABRIZIO MACAGNO 
individual purpose of one party prevails over the interactional goal. In this case, 
a party shifts to another type of dialogue to achieve his end. This situation is dif-
ferent from the type of non-constructive shift presented above. The shift from a 
negotiation to a quarrel is simply non-constructive, but it has not a specific func-
tion in a dialogue. This shift is dialectically useless, unless the failure of achiev-
ing a deal was the real purpose of one of the parties. On the contrary, one party 
can shift from one context to another pursuing an interactive goal that does not 
match the type of dialogue in which the participants were engaged. In this case, 
the shift is a fallacious dialectical strategy to prevail on the interlocutor. Many 
different fallacies or fallacious strategies can be analysed in terms of dialogical 
shifts.  
In a persuasion dialogue, one party may defend his own point of view with-
out accepting arguments supporting the opposite position. It tries to get the best 
out of the discussion, while his interlocutor aims at resolve a conflict of opinions. 
For instance, we can analyze the following case of biased argumentation (Walton 
1991, p. 2):  
Case 3  
Bob and Wilma are discussing the problem of acid rain. Wilma argues that 
reports on the extent of the problem are greatly exaggerated and that the 
costs of action are prohibitive. Bob points out that Wilma is on the board of 
directors of a U.S. coal company and that therefore her argument should not 
be taken at face value. 
On the other hand, a negotiation dialogue may be presented from one party 
as a persuasion dialogue. In the case below, the goal of the dialogue is to divide 
the labours within the household. The husband presents this negotiation as a per-
suasion dialogue, attributing to the interlocutor a different interactional goal. 
This strategy lies beneath the fallacy of straw man (Walton and Krabbe 1995, p. 
110):  
Case 4  
Wife: I’ll do the cooking if you’ll washes the dishes 
Husband: Why should I?   
Dialogues can shift from an argumentative context of dialogue to a non-
argumentative context, and vice versa. For instance, as seen above, a negotiation 
can shift to a quarrel. A fallacious case of such kinds of shifts is represented by 
some shifts from information-seeking dialogue to inquiry. For instance, a circular 
sequence of question-reply can be acceptable and reasonable in the context of an 
information-seeking, but if this circular reasoning is used to prove a point, in-
stead of providing information, the argument begs the question (Walton 1992).  
The clashing of a participant’s goal with the purpose of the interaction is 
evident in the case of the fallacious use of the argument from consequences. 
Reasoning from consequences is an argument scheme typical of deliberation or 
negotiation. However, it can be used in a persuasion dialogue, such as in the case 
below (Walton 2000, p. 133):  
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Case 5 
The United States had justice on its side in waging the Mexican war of 1848. 
To question this is unpatriotic, and would give comfort to our enemies by 
promoting the cause of defeatism.  
In this example, a persuasion dialogue shifts to a deliberation. The speaker 
cites the negative consequences not to support a viewpoint, that is the actual goal 
of the dialogue, but to advocate a decision.  
Argument from consequences is the basis of several emotional arguments, 
such as arguments from fear appeal, or appeal to threat, or appeal to pity. They 
are all grounded upon a prudential pattern of reasoning. This line of argument is 
reasonable in negotiation or (sometimes) in deliberation, but is fallacious when 
used in a persuasion dialogue. We can consider, for instance, case 6 (Walton and 
Krabbe, 1995, p. 109-110):  
Case 6 
A union leader argues for a pay raise. He points out that the workers may get 
very angry if they don’t get the pay raise and may go on strike with disas-
trous consequences for all. The president of the board retorts that, though he 
personally would be glad to grant the pay raise, his colleagues on the board 
would sooner close the shop.  
We can notice that, in this case, the union leader uses a threat to shift a per-
suasion dialogue to a negotiation. The interlocutor accepts the new dialogical 
context, and replies with another threat. The fallacy prevents the dialogue to 
move forward, turning it into a negotiation. The argument from appeal to pity 
involves a similar shift from persuasion to negotiation.  
Ad hominem arguments are arguments typical of eristic discussions, in 
which personal attacks are common and acceptable. However, when used in a 
debate or a critical discussion, they are highly inappropriate. They shift the dia-
logue into a quarrel. In (Walton 1993, p. 96) ad hominem fallacies are analyzed 
as illicit dialogical transitions. For instance, the following argument is part of a 
debate in which the theme is the goods and services tax (GST). This move does 
not contribute to the goal of the debate; on the contrary, it is simply a personal 
attack that leads to the dialogue degenerating into a quarrel:   
Case 7 
If the Minister really wants to reduce the deficit, if the Minister of Finance 
really wants to control the deficit, why does he not apply the GST to all the 
lies the Conservatives told in the last election campaign? Then our deficit 
would disappear overnight. 
Many other fallacies can be analyzed in terms of illicit dialogical shifts. For 
instance, consider the fallacy ad verecundiam (how can you deny this? Do you 
think you know this argument better than doctor X?) can be considered an illicit 
transition from persuasion dialogue to expert consultant (information seeking) 
dialogue. Ad ignorantiam arguments (I have no proofs that x is false, therefore x 
is true) are reasonable patterns of reasoning typical of an inquiry, but fallacious 
in most cases of deliberation dialogue.  
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However, if a normative model of dialogue types is useful to describe the 
principal categories of licit or illicit shifts, in order to assess and individuate dia-
logue shifts it is necessary to enlarge the concept of context of dialogue from a 
set of norms to the common ground which can be seen as the communicative set-
ting, the interlocutors’ positions, the knowledge taken for granted, which can be 
institutional or cultural. Shifts, in fact, can occur not only from a type of dialogue 
to another, but also between dialogues belonging to the same category, but char-
acterized by different rules. For instance, we can consider the argument from ig-
norance applied to a case in court. The line of reasoning “we do not have proofs 
supporting you are guilty, therefore you are not guilty” is acceptable; however, 
the contrary “you cannot prove you did not commit the crime, therefore you are 
guilty” in our legal system is simply fallacious. The fallaciousness, however, de-
pends upon the institutional rules of the dialogue. During the French revolution, 
the ad ignorantiam argument was perfectly reasonable. Similarly, threats are 
common in negotiation, but they have to respect certain limits the interpersonal 
relation and social rules impose. For instance, physical threats in a classroom are 
nowadays unacceptable, but considered reasonable few decades ago (see also 
Walton and Macagno, to appear). Shifts, moreover, may occur within contexts 
belonging to the same typology, but characterized by a different common ground 
between the interlocutors. For instance, the strategy of many questions, such as 
‘Have you stopped cheating on your income taxes?’ can be reasonable in a cross-
examination in which the person examined admitted before that he had cheated 
on his income taxes. In another context, in which this proposition was not admit-
ted, the move would have been fallacious.  
The theory of dialogue types and dialogue shifts opens new perspectives on 
the way the structure of a dialogue can be analysed. The typology of dialogue 
types involves the initial situation, the goal of the interaction, the type of com-
mitment. However, in order for the theory to explain the variety of shifts occur-
ring in everyday conversation factors such as the interpersonal relationship, the 
social constraints, and the common ground between the interlocutors should be 
included in a broader notion of dialogue context.  
3. Dialectical relevance and profiles of dialogue  
The distinction between licit and illicit shifts between types of dialogue or 
dialogue contexts (we will refer with this term to a broader notion of dialogue 
mentioned above, including the interlocutors’ common ground, their interper-
sonal relation, etc.) is closely related to the problem of dialectical relevance.  
We can distinguish between two levels of relevance, relative to the broad notion 
of “content”, or rather what the dialogue is about, and to the dialectical perspec-
tive, how the goal of the dialogue and its topic are fulfilled. The difference be-
tween these two levels can be explained by means of an example (Levinson 
1983, p. 111):  
Case 8 
A: I do think Mrs. Jenkins is an old windbag, don’t you?  
B: Huh, lovely weather for March, isn’t it?  
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In this case, the issue of the dialogue, or rather what the dialogue is about, 
shifts. The explanation of this change can be found at a dialectical level: A looks 
for the best explanation of why B refuses to accept the dialogue advanced. A 
possible reason can be that the person the opinion expressed is about is nearby, 
or that B is a close friend of Mrs Jenkins, etc. However, in the cases 4, 5, 6, 7 
above, the issue has not shifted. What is irrelevant is the way the communicative 
interaction is bought about. In other words, it is not possible to explain the cases 
above only in terms of topic. The classic notion of relevance (see Grice, 1957, 
Levinson 1983; Sperber and Wilson 1986) encompasses these two levels, or bet-
ter, the analysis we advance splits in two layers the classic linguistic concept. 
This division is necessary, however, because if a content irrelevance can be ex-
amined at a dialectical level, a dialectical irrelevance might not involve any topic 
or issue shift. At the content level, we can represent relevance in dialogue as pic-
tured in figure 1. 
                 
Figure 1: Content Relevance in Dialogue 
In this diagram, we can notice that in a dialogue the issues must be sub-
ordered to the main issue in order to fulfil the requisite of content relevance. In 
other words, the sub-issues must be somehow connected to the “frame” (see for 
this notion Fillmore 2003) involved by the concept at stake.   
The concept of dialectical relevance can be articulated at two levels, a global 
and a local one. The global level is represented in figure 1 by the main issue. In a 
critical discussion, for example, this is the conflict of opinions that is supposed to 
be resolved by the dialogue. Each specific issue of the four represented in figure 
1 is an issue that is discussed at a local level. The discussion of one issue leads to 
the next one.  
Dialectical shifts need to be taken into account as well. At a global level, it 
is possible to observe that shifts from critical discussion to quarrel are illicit, 
since a quarrel does not move forward the goal of a critical discussion. Similarly, 
shifts from persuasion to deliberation are usually not good. However, if we want 
to analyze the reason why a move is not relevant in a specific dialogue, and in-
quire into the conditions of relevance of the move, the analysis has be developed 
at a local level. The examination of relevance at a local level has to assess 
whether a move was an answer to a question relevant to the previous sequences 
of dialogue. In other words, if we imagine the process of argumentation as a 
question-reply interaction, an argument always answers a question, or a possible 
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doubt of the interlocutor. If the move does not fulfil the role of answering the 
relevant question at that point in the dialogue, it is irrelevant.  
This principle is the basis of Walton’s theory of profiles of dialogue, devel-
oped in (Walton, 1989, pp. 65-71). A profile of dialogue represents connected 
sequences of dialogical moves. A profile, in other terms, is a kind of focus on a 
fragment of dialogue, in which a move is evaluated in relation to the previous 
and subsequent context of dialogue. For instance, a question can be represented 
in profile 1 (Walton, 1989, p. 67). 
Profile 1: Generic Profile of Dialogue 
A move, in this model, has to respect the context in which it occurs, and the 
conditions the context imposes on it. The relevance of a question must be evalu-
ated in relation to the context of answers and questions provided in the previous 
sequence of dialogue. In this perspective, the notion of common ground is related 
to the possibility of fulfilling an appropriate move in a dialogue. Profile 2 
(Walton 1989, p. 68) shows an ideal sequence of question-reply for the fallacy of 
many questions.  
Profile 2: Profile of Dialogue for the Spouse Abuse Question 
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From this model, we can observe that the ideal sequence of moves represents the 
context and the knowledge required in order for a move to be adequate. From the 
comparison between the ideal model and the real dialogue the acceptability of 
the move is evaluated.  
Similarly, profiles of dialogue were used to evaluate when an argument from 
ignorance is adequate in a certain context of dialogue (see Walton, 1999). The 
argument, after being reconstructed, is compared to an ideal sequence of ques-
tion-replies, connected to the rest of the dialogue. The sequence is supposed to 
move the dialogue further. From the comparison between the question the argu-
ment is supposed to answer to and the role it actually plays, its dialectical rele-
vance is assessed.  
For instance, we can apply the method of profiles of dialogue to assess the 
dialectical relevance of case 4 above, in which the wife tries to negotiate the di-
vision of the labour, while the husband shifts the dialogue to a persuasion dia-
logue. We can represent the profile of dialogue the wife’s move opens as fol-
lows:  
Case 4  
Wife: I’ll do the cooking if you’ll washes the dishes 
Husband: Why should I?   
The argumentation sequence in case 4 can be represented in profile 3 below. 
Profile 3: Profile of Dialogue for Case 3 
In this case, the wife’s move is a proposal that can be fulfilled by the hus-
band in different ways. In the profile the possibilities are outlined. The husband’s 
answer is then compared to this model, and from the comparison it is possible to 
notice that it does not play the role of replying to a proposal imposed by the con-
text. The move is for this reason considered dialectically irrelevant.  
To conclude, we can notice that the theory of dialogue shifts can be applied 
to an analysis of real arguments only within a model of dialectical relevance. 
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Dialectical shifts can be assessed as relevant or irrelevant in two fashions: by 
evaluating relevance at a global or at a local level. The global level is a more 
general and less specific point of view on the structure of the dialogue. On the 
contrary, the local level of relevance connects the dialogue move to the role it 
has to fulfil in a context. The model of profiles of dialogue, for this reason, can 
be considered the foundation of the theory of dialogue shifts as tools for analys-
ing the fallaciousness or acceptability of arguments.  
4. Profiles of dialogue and textual cohesion  
The technique of profiles of dialogue can be considered to be a useful de-
scriptive instrument to analyze and describe shifts. However, a profile does not 
provide an explanation of the reason why a shift from a type of dialogue into an-
other fails to be acceptable. As noticed above, it is not possible to determine the 
licit and illicit shifts on the basis of dialogue types. Taking into consideration a 
broader concept of dialogue context (for a connection between context and dia-
logue types theory see also (Van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2005)), a simple 
analysis grounded upon the compatible and incompatible types of dialogue does 
not provide an acceptable analytical tool. The theory of dialogue shifts can be 
developed adopting a linguistic, instead of normative, perspective. The two 
grounds upon which this theoretical proposal can be founded are the notions of 
textual connective and action theory and the idea of the dialectical shift. 
4.1. Congruity theory  
In the congruity theory (see Rigotti and Rocci, 2001; Rigotti and Rocci 
2006), the text is seen as a hierarchy of predicates, having as arguments textual 
sequences. In order to explain the notion of congruity, it is useful to briefly in-
troduce what is meant by predicate and what is the relation between a predicate 
and its arguments.  
In congruity theory, predicates are considered to be possible ways of being, 
which impose a set of conditions upon their arguments, that is, the entities in-
volved in that predicate. For instance, the predicate ‘to eat’, involving two predi-
cates (x1, the eating being, and x2, the eaten thing), presupposes for instance that 
x2 is a solid food. A sentence such as “I ate water” would be meaningless, unless 
the word “to eat” is used metaphorically to manifest another predicate. Similarly, 
textual sequences can be conceived as arguments of a higher predicate, imposing 
a set of conditions on them. For instance we can consider the following (Rigotti 
and Rocci 2001, p. 72):  
Case 9:  
Il fait beau. Mais nous devons terminer notre papier sur le non-sens.  
The connective ‘mais’ presupposes two sequences, p and q, such as that p 
must be interpreted as an argument supporting a conclusion r (pĺr), while q as 
supporting the contrary or contradictory conclusion non-r. Predicates connecting 
textual sequences can be explicit or implicit. For instance, we can analyze the 
following text (Rigotti, 2005, p. 81):  
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Case 10:  
My son does not drive. He is five.  
Here the meaning of the second sequence can be drawn only from the type 
of implicit relationship between the two sequences. The relationship, which we 
can conceive as an implicit predicate, is one of ‘explanation’.  
     Textual connective, as mentioned above, is between sequences, fragments of 
a text, namely a communicative event between the interlocutors, not simply sen-
tences, abstract linguistic models. For instance, if we consider a situation in 
which one walking past stops a stranger and tells him:  
Case 11:  
Do you know that Bob got married last week?  
In this case, we can observe that there is not cohesion between the implicit 
connective, that we can represent as ‘to inform’ or ‘to tell a good news’, and the 
sequence. Some fundamental presuppositions are not met, that is, the hearer does 
not know Bob, and is not interested in what has happened to him. The context, 
the mutual knowledge, and the interlocutors’ interests are to be considered argu-
ments of the connective, the fundamental ground of textual cohesion, which we 
can represent in figure 2. 
Figure 2: The Fundamental Ground of Textual Cohesion (Rigotti 2005, p. 
83) 
In this perspective, the text, or better the sequences of the text, are connected 
not only to the communicative intention (the relation between them), but also to 
the common ground, or context, including mutual knowledge (see for this con-
cept Clark 1996).  
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4.2. Cohesion and profiles of dialogue  
Congruity theory can be easily applied to a dialectical interaction (for the 
concept of interaction, see Rigotti and Cigada 2004). The interlocutors in an in-
teraction have distinct goals: for instance, if we consider the typologies of dia-
logue they might each want to get the best deal, or to persuade the other party, or 
one party to seek information and the other give it. The principle of examining 
the types of dialogue according to the interlocutors’ intentions can be better ex-
plained by quoting a passage from the Topics, in which the bases of this idea can 
be found (Topics, VIII, 5):  
Inasmuch as no rules are laid down for those who argue for the sake of train-
ing and of examination:-and the aim of those engaged in teaching or learn-
ing is quite different from that of those engaged in a competition; as is the 
latter from that of those who discuss things together in the spirit of inquiry: 
for a learner should always state what he thinks: for no one is even trying to 
teach him what is false; whereas in a competition the business of the ques-
tioner is to appear by all means to produce an effect upon the other, while 
that of the answerer is to appear unaffected by him; on the other hand, in an 
assembly of disputants discussing in the spirit not of a competition but of an 
examination and inquiry, there are as yet no articulate rules about what the 
answerer should aim at, and what kind of things he should and should not 
grant for the correct or incorrect defence of his position:-inasmuch, then, as 
we have no tradition bequeathed to us by others, let us try to say something 
upon the matter for ourselves. 
In Aristotle’s perspective, the interlocutors’ common goal and positions 
(roles) establish the dialogue typology. In Walton’s types of dialogue, the goal of 
each party is generally to succeed. However, in order for the communication to 
be successful, the interlocutors must have a common goal, which can be called at 
a local level a profile of dialogue, at a broader level a dialogue type, or better, a 
context of dialogue. With this latter term we identify a dialogue type situated 
within a specific context. In terms of congruity theory, the goal or function of the 
conversation can be seen as a higher connective, imposing the conditions on the 
communicative moves. For instance, we consider case 4, already mentioned 
above:
Case 4  
Wife: I’ll do the cooking if you’ll washes the dishes 
Husband: Why should I?   
According to the enlarged perspective of profiles of dialogue, we can notice 
that the dialogue opened by Wife has as main goal a ‘negotiation of domestic 
tasks’. The irrelevance, in this perspective, can be explained in terms of incon-
gruity with the connective. The goal of Husband’s move is not to reach a com-
mon agreement, neither to get the best deal (for instance negotiating for not do-
ing anything at all), but to make the interlocutor “lose the dialogue game”. Hus-
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band, in other terms, wants Wife to lose, and refuses to enter into the discussion 
at the conditions Wife has set out by means of the implicit connective.  
     This approach has two main implications. First, dialectical shifts are analyzed 
in terms of incongruity, and not simply of irrelevance. Second, dialectical shifts 
are examined from the point of view of the goal of the interlocutor who shifts the 
dialogue. While embeddings or “relevant changes of dialogue type” can be seen 
as re-negotiations of the connective in order to fulfil the same goal the interlocu-
tor has as a target, other dialectical shifts are ways of eluding the conversation 
and its grounds. In other words, Husband, in the case above, aims at changing the 
grounds of the conversation, that is, to reach an agreement on a topic. His dialec-
tical shift, even though it might be interpreted as a shift from a type of negotia-
tion to another, actually is a shift to a contest, or eristic dialogue. If we take into 
consideration Aristotle’s Topics, we can observe that the idea of the dialectical 
shift is present in the book dedicated to the dialogical strategies, book VIII (Top-
ics, VIII, 11):  
Accordingly it sometimes becomes necessary to attack the speaker and not 
his position, when the answerer lies in wait for the points that are contrary to 
the questioner and becomes abusive as well: when people lose their tempers 
in this way, their argument becomes a contest, not a discussion. 
The principle that a man who hinders the common business is a bad partner, 
clearly applies to an argument as well; for in arguments as well there is a 
common aim in view, except with mere contestants, for these cannot both 
reach the same goal; for more than one cannot possibly win. It makes no dif-
ference whether he effects this as answerer or as questioner: for both he who 
asks contentious questions is a bad dialectician, and also he who in answer-
ing fails to grant the obvious answer or to understand the point of the ques-
tioner's inquiry.  
In this passage, it is possible to understand how the fault of a shift to an ad-
versarial contest is to disregard the common goal. The arguer, in other term, re-
fuses the bases of the conversation, aiming at his own goal and leading the other 
party to lose.  
5. Dialogue Types and Dialectical Relevance 
The idea of types of dialogue can be considered the core of the new dialecti-
cal theory of fallacies, intended as moves that can be acceptable in certain con-
texts of dialogue, but unacceptable in others. Dialogue types, according to the 
new dialectical theory, are normative frameworks characterized by specific rules 
and representing different types of interactions. A move can fulfil the purpose of 
a dialogue type, or comply with its rules, but in another dialogical context it 
would not be constructive for the purpose of the dialogue. Dialogue types, whose 
basis were mentioned in Aristotle’s Organon, can be conceived as tools to evalu-
ate the relevance of a move.  
According to the new dialectical approach, one dialogue can shift into an-
other in a relevant or irrelevant way. In the first case, a move makes the dialogue 
shift in order for the goal of the interaction to be fulfilled. In the second case, on 
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the contrary, the shift is a hindrance for the dialogical purpose. Shifts may occur 
between dialogue types, or simply between different contexts belonging to the 
same type of interaction. The general goal of a dialogue cannot, in fact, explain 
many fallacious shifts which are irrelevant not relative to the general purpose, 
but to the specific kind of interpersonal relation between the interlocutors. The 
notion of dialectical relevance is basic to the theory of dialogue types. It is the 
foundation of the evaluation of an argument’s acceptability. However, the ab-
stract theory of dialogue types needs to be connected to the empirical analysis of 
everyday arguments. The model of profiles of dialogue allows one to examine 
the local relevance of a move, in relation to the role it is supposed to fulfil in a 
broader context of dialogue.  
The goal of this paper is to present a theoretical development of the model 
of dialogue types in the new dialectic. Including the notion of context and inter-
locutors’ goals in the new dialectic’s normative framework makes it possible to 
understand the reason behind the norms regulating of the dialogues, and the prin-
ciples underlying the notion of dialectical relevance by means of the theory of 
profiles of dialogue. This approach is founded upon a linguistic account of dia-
logue and text, stemming from congruity theory. Dialogues are seen as texts and 
textual sequences ruled by a higher predicate. By analysing dialogues not only as 
successions of moves, but as an activities, factors such as agents and their goal 
can be included in the notion of dialogue, together with context and common 
ground. Dialectical relevance, in this perspective, is seen as based on fulfilment 
of the conditions the predicate representing the interactional purpose imposes on 
the sequence. Dialectical shifts can be seen as moves or sequences congruous or 
incongruous with the goal of the conversation. At a normative level shifts can 
occur potentially between most of the dialogue types, at a level in which the in-
terlocutor’s communicative intentions are relevant. A fallacious argument often 
occurs where there has been a shift in which an interlocutor does not respect the 
mutual target and transforms the dialogue into an eristic contest, or some other 
type of dialogue different form the original one.  
References  
Aristotle, Topics, trans.  E. S. Forster, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, 
Mass., Harvard University Press, 1939. 
Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, 
Mass., Harvard University Press, 1928. 
Clark, H. (1996). Using Language. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.  
Eemeren, F. H. van, Houtlosser, P. (2005). Theoretical Construction and Ar-
gumentative Reality: An Analytic Model of Critical Discussion and Convention-
alised Types of Argumentative Activity. In Hitchcock, D. (ed.), The Uses of Ar-
gument: Proceedings of a conference at McMaster University, 18-21 May 2005.
Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation.  
Fillmore, C. J. (2003). Double-Decker Definitions: The role of Frames in 
Meaning Explanation. Sign Language Studies 3, 3: 263-295 
Grice, H. P. (1957). Meaning. Philosophical Review, 66: 377-388 
Levinson, S. (1983). Pragmatics. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.  
TYPES OF DIALOGUE, DIALECTICAL RELEVANCE… 119 
Perelman, C. and Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1969), The New Rhetoric: A Treatise 
on Argumentation, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press. 
Rigotti, E. (2005). Congruity Theory and Argumentation. Studies in Com-
munication Sciences, 5, 75-96 
Rigotti, E., Rocci, A. (2001). Sens –Non-sens –Contresens. Studies in Com-
munication Sciences, 1, 45-80  
Rigotti, E., Rocci, A. (2006). Tema-rema e connettivo: la congruità semanti-
co-pragmatica del testo. In Gobber, G., Gatti, M. C., Cigada S. (Eds.), Sýdesmoi. 
Connettivi nella realtà dei testi. Milano, Vita e Pensiero.  
Rigotti, E., Cigada, S. (2004). La Comunicazione Verbale. Milano, Apogeo.  
Sperber, D., Wilson, D. (1986). Relevance. Communication and Cognition.
Oxford, Blackwell 
Walton, D., Krabbe, E. C. W. (1995). Commitment in Dialogue. Albany, 
State University of New York Press. 
Walton, D. (1989). Informal Logic. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Walton, D. (1990). What is Reasoning? What is an Argument? Journal of 
Philosophy, 87, 399-419 
Walton, D. (1991). Bias, Critical Doubt and Fallacies. Argumentation and 
Advocacy, 28, 1-22. 
Walton, D. (1992). Types of Dialogue, Dialectical Shifts and Fallacies. In 
Frans H. van Eemeren van al. (eds.), Argumentation Illuminated, Amsterdam, 
SICSAT, 133-147. 
Walton, Douglas (1993). Commitment, types of dialogue, and fallacies. In-
formal Logic, XIV, 2 -3, 93-104  
Walton, D. (1998). The New Dialectic. Conversational Contexts of Argu-
ment. University of Toronto Press, Toronto. 
Walton, D. (1999). Profiles of Dialogue for Evaluating Arguments from Ig-
norance. Argumentation, 13, 53-71 
Walton, D., (2000). Scare Tactics. Dordrecht, Holland, Kluwer. 
Walton, D., Macagno, F. (to appear). The Fallaciousness of Threats: Charac-
ter and Ad Baculum. Submitted to Argumentation.  
Douglas N. Walton  
University of Winnipeg 
d.walton@uwinnipeg.ca 
Fabrizio Macagno 
Catholic University of Milan 
fabrizio.macagno@hotmail.com 
